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EXPANDING THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY OF
SUCCESSOR CORPORATIONS
The final cause of law is the welfare of society. The rule
that misses its aim cannot permanently justify its existence.'
The growth of products liability law has demonstrated the truth in
Justice Cardozo's observation. His main contribution to the field was
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,2 in which he eliminated the require-
ment of privity of contract in negligence actions against manufacturers.
In another landmark case, Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,8
Justice Traynor, by creating the doctrine of products liability without
negligence in tort, dispensed with the requirement of notice of breach of
an implied warranty which had been an impediment to recovery from
manufacturers and distributors of products. The basic postulate of
products liability law is that consumers deserve special protection
against the risk of personal injury inherent in the products they buy and
use.' Legal rules which contradict this policy have been discarded.
Nevertheless, sellers of products may escape liability for injury
occurring as a result of the use of their defective products by virtue of
the rule of corporate law that a purchaser of an existing business does
not assume the liability of the former corporation unless such liability is
expressly assumed in the contract of sale or the two corporate entities
have blended.5 This corporate law rule is directly in conflict with the
policy underlying products liability law and is being used to frustrate
consumers' actions for injuries suffered from the use of products.
A recent California case, Ortiz v. South Bend Lathe,6 provides an
illustration. In 1967, Refugio Ortiz was injured by a defective punch
press which his employer had bought in 1955 from the Meyer Compa-
ny, a distributor of sheet metal machinery. Ortiz could not sue the
manufacturer of the press, the Johnson Machine and Press Company,
1. B. CARDozo, TE NATURE OF THE JUDICuL PRocEss 66 (1921).
2. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
3. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
4. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436,
440-41 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); Suvada v. 'White Motor Co., 32 II. 2d 612,
618-19, 210 N.E.2d 182, 186 (1965).
5. For a discussion of this rule see notes 35-78 & accompanying text infra;
Annot., 66 A.L.R.3d 824 (1975).
6. 46 Cal. App. 3d 842, 844, 120 Cal. Rptr. 556, 557 (1975).
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because the company did not exist at the time of the injury. All of
Johnson's assets had been acquired by the Bontrager Corporation in
1956. The Amsted Corporation, in turn, had purchased all of Bontra-
ger's assets in 1962 and continued to manufacture the Johnson press
line under that trade name through its subsidiary, South Bend Lathe.
The California court of appeal denied the plaintiff recovery against
Amsted, even though the company had succeeded to the business of
manufacturing the same press that caused the injury.7  The court held
that although Bontrager had assumed the liabilities of Johnson, Amsted
had not assumed the liabilities of Bontrager.8 Under the court's inter-
pretation, there was neither an express nor an implied assumption of
liability in the assets sale contract.9 Furthermore, since Bontrager had
received cash rather than Amsted stock in consideration for its assets,
rights, trademarks, and business goodwill, and since Bontrager had
remained in existence after the sale before eventually dissolving, the
court saw no reason to find the nonstatutory merger necessary for an
assumption of products liability by operation of law.10 In the words of
the court, "[t]he two corporate entities were completely separate and
distinct both before and after the sale.""
Ortiz is typical of current judicial treatment of the liability of
corporate business successors for the defective products of their prede-
cessors. 2 The courts have continued to hold that the separateness of
corporate entities is the determinative factor, refusing to recognize that
the policy of products liability cannot be effectuated unless such cases
turn instead on the existence of an ongoing relationship between the
product line of a business and the consumer public.
In contrast to the acceptance by the majority in Ortiz that the rules
of corporate assumption of liabilities should be the ratio decidendi in
such cases is the view of Justice Fleming in dissent:
7. Id. at 849, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 560. At trial, the superior court entered judgment
in favor of the plaintiff against Meyer, the distributor, and Amsted, the successor to the
manufacturer, and in favor of Meyer against Amsted for indemnification. The court of
appeal reversed both of the judgments against Amsted, leaving Meyer with full liability.
Id. at 845, 850, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 557, 560.
8. Id. at 845-47, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 558-59.
9. Id. at 847, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 558.
10. Id. In both the statutory merger and the nonstatutory de facto merger, the
liabilities of the dissolving corporation are transferred to the purchasing corporation
whether it wants them or not. See notes 52-58 & accompanying text infra.
11. 46 Cal. App. 3d at 847, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 558.
12. See, e.g., Bazan v. Kux Mach. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1250 (E.D. Wis. 1973);
Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968) (applying California
law); Schwartz v. McGraw-Edison Co., 14 Cal. App. 3d 767, 92 Cal. Rptr. 776 (1971);
McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (L. Div. 1970), af'd
per curiam 118 N.J. Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585 (App. Div. 1972).
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Product liability today has become an integral part of a manufac-
turing business, and the liability attaches to the business like fleas
to a dog, where it remains imbedded regardless of changes in
ownership of the business. So long as the business retains its
distinctive identity and character and continues to be operated as
it has in the past, defective product liability adheres to the
business and remains there until discharged by bankruptcy or
comparable judicial act.' 3
Justice Fleming was declaring more an ideal than an actuality. As the
law now exists, if a corporation sheds its manufacturing business but
retains its corporate form, even for a brief period, before dissolving,
products liability will not survive to burden the transferee. 4
Although products liability plaintiffs can sue manufacturers, whole-
salers, and retailers,' 5 they cannot recover from the corporation which
has purchased the assets of the original offending corporation when the
purchaser has had the presence of mind to conduct the transaction as a
sale and not a merger.' 6 This note will discuss whether or not a
plaintiff should have the right, irrespective of current corporate law
limitations, to recover from a corporation that continues making the
product of a dissolved manufacturer when the injury has occurred after
the dissolution. Ortiz is one of many cases in which consumers have
been denied recovery by reason of corporate law rules inapposite to the
policies of consumer protection underlying products liability.' 7 The suc-
ceeding sections will examine the lack of a remedy for most products
liability plaintiffs against the disappearing manufacturer, the various
judge-made criteria for imposing successor products liability, and the
public policies of consumer protection which have influenced the devel-
opment of products liability law. Finally, a new rule will be proposed
which would protect victims of defective products when the offending
business has changed hands and the manufacturer of the specific product
has vanished.
Predecessor and Successor Nonliability:
The Plight of the Products Liability Plaintiff
Banquo: [W]hither are they vanish'd?
Macbeth: Into the air; and what seem'd corporal, melted
As breath into the wind.-Would they had stay'd!'
13. Ortiz v. South Bend Lathe, 46 Cal. App. 3d 842, 851, 120 Cal. Rptr. 556, 561
(1975) (Fleming, J., dissenting).
14. See note 71 & accompanying text infra.
15. See W. PRossun, LAW oF TORTS 663-65 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
PRossER] (discussion of products liability defendants).
16. See notes 35, 52-58 & accompanying text infra.
17. See cases cited note 12 supra.
18. W. SHArnsE'RE, MAeET, Act I, sc. iii.
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There are three ways' 9 for a corporation to acquire,20 absorb,2 or
otherwise gain control of one or more other corporations: (1) statutory
merger or consolidation;2 (2) sale of all stock of the acquired corpora-
tion to a purchaser in exchange for stock, cash, or other property; 3 and
(3) sale of substantially all the assets of the acquired corporation to a
purchasing corporation in exchange for stock, cash, or other considera-
tion.24 When a manufacturer decides to get out of a business, the
19. See generally B. Fox & E. Fox, CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS, in
13A BusINEss ORGANIZATIONS §§ 23.01-23.04 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Fox]. These
methods of acquisiton correspond, in part, to the three forms of reorganization described
in the revision of the California Corporations Code, to become effective January 1,
1977. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 181 (West Supp. 1976) (popularly known as A.B. 376).
By defining the term "reorganization" as either a statutory merger, a stock acquisition, or
a sale of assets for stock (as distinct from cash), the new California statute departs from
the customary corporate law usage of the term to denote the creation of a new
corporation to receive the property and continue the business of the old one, or the
continuation of the old corporation under a different name or management. See 15 W.
FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7201, at 386-87 (rev. ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited
as FLETCHER]. A familiar form of reorganization is that which is occasionally accom-
plished under chapter ten of the Federal Bankruptcy Act for the relief of corporations in
financial distress. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1970).
20. A corporation can acquire either the assets or the stock of another corporation
and still not be said to have absorbed the other corporation if the two remain separate
corporate entities. When a corporation has simply purchased a majority of the shares of
another corporation, it does not thereby become legally liable for the acquired corpora-
tion's obligations. The acquiring corporation's liability is limited to the extent of its
interest. See Freling, Tax Consequences of Nontax Motivated Aspects and Factors in
the Sale of a Corporate Business, N.Y.U. 21ST INST. ON FED. TAx. 1107, 1131 (1963).
21. Absorption can be defined as a type of acquisition. When one corporation
absorbs another, the former becomes liable for the latter's obligations because the two
corporations become one. Absorption describes mergers and sales of assets which can be
labeled de facto mergers. See notes 52-58 & accompanying text infra.
22. For a discussion of merger and consolidation see notes 53-56 & accompanying
text infra.
23. In a stock acquisition, the purchaser becomes a stockholder in the acquired
corporation, which retains its separate corporate existence. C. SCHARF, ACQUISrrIONS,
MERGERS, SALES AND TAKEOVERS 117, 251-52 (1971); Freling, Tax Consequences of
Nontax Motivated Aspects and Factors in the Sale of a Corporate Business, N.Y.U. 21ST
INST. ON FED. TAx. 1107, 1131 (1963). As a stockholder, the acquiring corporation
assumes the economic risk of the seller's products liability to the extent of its interest in
the seller. Id.
A stock acquisition can be accomplished without the formal approval of the
stockholders or in direct opposition to the management of the acquired corporation
through a tender offer of cash to its stockholders at an attractive price. In contrast,
acquisitions by merger or purchase of assets require the approval of the management and
up to two-thirds of the shareholders of the acquired corporation under most state
statutes. Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L.
REV. 317, 318 (1967).
24. The term "assets" refers to the aggregate of property, stock in trade, and cash
belonging to a company. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 151 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
State statutes require, in sales of assets not "in the usual and regular course of ...
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ability of a products liability plaintiff to recover at a future date depends
on how the manufacturer transfers the business to the acquiring corpo-
ration. In some transfers, the acquiring corporation automatically as-
sumes responsibility for claims any person might have against the manu-
facturer. In this category are mergers and consolidations, and sales of
assets when either the contract expressly provides for assumption of
liability or the elements of a de facto merger are found.25 In other
transfers, however, no liability is assumed, and the products liability
plaintiff can bring his action only against the original manufacturer. In
this category are sales of assets for cash and sales of assets for stock
when there is no de facto merger.26 The problem posed to the products
liability plaintiff when faced with a transaction in the latter category is
that by the terms of most asset acquisition contracts, the manufacturer-
seller promises to end its existence by voluntary dissolution pursuant to
the applicable state statute. 7 Under such statutes, the dissolving corpo-
ration continues to exist for no other purpose than to be sued.28 As a
business," the approval of the shareholders of the selling corporation. W. PAUNTER,
Busnss PLANNING 622 (1975) [hereinafter cited as PAINTER]. No approval is required
by and no dissenters' rights are given to the shareholders of the purchasing corporation
unless the transaction can be construed as a de facto merger. Id. at 622, 624.
25. See text accompanying notes 52-58 infra.
26. See text accompanying notes 35, 62-71 infra.
27. See, e.g., Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 363 (3d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975); Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F.
Supp. 797, 798-99 (W.D. Mich. 1974); Bazan v. Kux Mach. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1250,
1252 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817, 819-20 (D. Colo.
1968); Ortiz v. South Bend Lathe, 46 Cal. App. 3d 842, 846, 120 Cal. Rptr. 556, 558
(1975).
Dissolution is distinct from liquidation. Dissolution is the end of a corporation's
legal existence, while liquidation is the winding up process of gathering assets, satisfying
creditors' claims, and distributing the remainder to shareholders, giving liquidation
preferences to preferred shareholders. H. HENN, ConeoRATIoNs 814 (2d ed. 1970)
[hereinafter cited as HENN]. According to the particular statute, liquidation either
precedes or follows dissolution. See id.
The contract for the sale of all corporate assets normally requires voluntary or
nonjudicial dissolution of the seller, approved by the shareholders of the dissolving
corporation. See id. at 720. Involuntary dissolution, such as that accomplished in a
proceeding brought by a minority shareholder to dissolve a deadlocked corporation,
requires judicial supervision. PAniTER, supra note 24, at 279 (1975). For a thorough
treatment of dissolution and its effects on products liability claims against the disappear-
ing manufacturer see Henn & Alexander, Effect of Corporate Dissolution on Products
Liability Claims, 56 CORNELL L. Rv. 865 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Henn & Alex-
ander].
28. For a discussion of the variations among the statutes see Henn & Alexander,
supra note 27, at 879-97. Some statutes specify a period of two or three years during
which the acquired corporation can be sued. See, e.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP.
Acr § 105 (rev. ed. 1974) (two year survival of claims period). Some other statutes
impose no time limitation. See, e.g., CAL. CoRP. CODB § 5400 (West 1955). The
revision of the California Corporations Code has a similar section, which provides: "A
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practical matter, however, the disappearing manufacturer, even if in this
limbo-like state, will not have any assets against which a products
liability judgment could be executed.2 9 The directors of the dissolving
corporation are required by statute to make adequate provision for
known debts and liabilities before they distribute what is left to the
shareholders, 0 but they have no duty to provide funds for the payment
of products liability and other claims of which they have no knowledge
at the time of dissolution.81 If an ample amount of funds has been
reserved to pay the known claims32 of creditors, not even the directors or
shareholders can be held liable, 3 and the plaintiff whose products
liability claim arises after dissolution may thus have no effective remedy
against the original manufacturer of the product. 4
With regard to the three forms of corporate acquisition, it is only
after a sale of assets, subject to exceptions, that the products liability
plaintiff will be denied relief from the successor. The accepted rule is
that a bona fide purchaser for value of another company's assets is not
liable for the obligations of the seller.8 5 This rule applies to tort as well
corporation which is dissolved nevertheless continues to exist for the purpose of winding
up its affairs, prosecuting actions by or against it and enabling it to collect and discharge
obligations, dispose of and convey its property and collect and divide its assets, but not
for the purpose of continuing business except so far as necessary for the winding up
thereof." Id. § 2010(a) (West Supp. 1976).
29. As a legal rather than practical matter in half of the states, by virtue of the
adoption of the Model Business Corporations Act, post-dissolution claims, which include
many for products liability, are not even allowed. The Model Act provides for survival
of claims during a two-year period following dissolution. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP.
ACT § 105 (rev. ed. 1974). Products liability claims which arise upon injury after an
asset sale do not survive and cannot be asserted because they were not in existence at the
time of dissolution.
30. See, e.g., id. § 87; CAL. CoP. CODE § 2004 (West Supp. 1976).
31. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2004 (West Supp. 1976).
32. Known claims, in the revision of the California Corporations Code, include
those of creditors whose names are unknown to the directors of the dissolving corpora-
tion. Id. § 2008.
33. See Henn & Alexander, supra note 27, at 908.
34. There are three types of products liability claims-warranty, negligence, and
strict liability. See generally PROSSER, supra note 15, at 641-82 (4th ed. 1971). Under
the Uniform Commercial Code the cause of action for breach of warranty accrues when
"tender of delivery is made." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-725. Tort claims for
negligence, and, in most jurisdictions which have addressed the question, for strict
liability, do not accrue until the physical injury occurs. Henn & Alexander, supra note
27, at 871-77. That a claim for breach of warranty arises before dissolution of the
manufacturer even though the injury occurs after dissolution does not alter the result
stated in the text. Irrespective of the products liability theory, the claimant will not sue
until the injury occurs, at which time the dissolved corporation will, more often than not,
be judgment proof.
35. E.g., Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 364 (3d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975); Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d
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as contractual liability.3 6 The courts have, however, formulated four
exceptions 7 to the rule, finding the purchaser liable: (1) when the
purchasing corporation expressly or impliedly agrees to assume the
seller's obligations;8 (2) when the transaction amounts to a merger or
consolidation of the seller with the purchaser;3 9 (3) when the purchas-
ing corporation is merely a continuation of the selling corporation; 40 and
(4) when the transaction was entered into fraudulently in order to
escape liability.41
That an express assumption of the seller's liabilities constitutes an
exception to the rule of nonassumption is only a restatement of the
obvious. In one case an implied assumption of the risk of products
liability claims which were unforeseen at the time of the asset sale was
based upon a broad express assumption clause in the sale contract and
upon the seller's transferral of a products liability insurance policy to the
purchaser.42 Liability for existing contracts of the acquired corporation
is frequently assumed by the purchaser as part of the consideration;
alternatively, the seller is ensured ample cash reserves to pay the claims
of creditors.43 Unforeseen products liability, however, is not ordinarily
expressly assumed as part of the exchange because the dissolving manu-
facturer is exposed to only a remote possibility of such liability.44
621, 625 (7th Cir. 1971); West Texas Ref. & Dev. Co. v. Commissioner, 68 F.2d 77
(10th Cir. 1933); Bazan v. Kux Mach. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1250 (E.D. Wis. 1973);
Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968) (applying California
law); Copease Mfg. Co. v. Cormac Photocopy Corp., 242 F. Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y.
1965); Schwartz v. McGraw-Edison Co., 14 Cal. App. 3d 767, 780, 92 Cal. Rptr.
776, 783 (1971); Buis v. Peabody Coal Co., 41 Ill. App. 2d 317, 190 N.E.2d 507 (1963);
McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (L. Div. 1970), aff'd
per curiam, 118 N.J. Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585 (App. Div. 1972); FLETCHm, supra note
19, § 7122, at 188; 19 AM. JuR. 2D Corporations § 1546 (1965).
36. FrLEcHER, supra note 19, § 7123, at 196.
37. See id. § 7122, at 188, 192-96 nn.6-11 (list of cases applying the exceptions).
See also PAnrzr, supra note 24, at 623; C. ScHARv, AcQusrroNs, MERGERs, SAIEs AND
TAKEovERs 117-18 (1971).
38. E.g., Bouton v. Litton Indus., Inc., 423 F.2d 643, 652 (3d Cir. 1970).
39. E.g., Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 801 (W.D. Mich.
1974); see Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 965 (1975).
40. E.g., Bishop v. Dura-Lite Mfg. Co., 489 F.2d 710 (6th Cir. 1973); McKee v.
I-arris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 570, 264 A.2d 98, 106 (L. Div. 1970), af'd per
curiam 118 NJ. Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585 (App. Div. 1972).
41. Pierce v. Riverside Mortgage See. Co., 25 Cal. App. 2d 248, 257-58, 77 P.2d
226, 230-31 (1938); FLETc ER, supra note 19, § 7122, at 188; id. § 7125, at 201. See
McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 NJ. Super. 555, 571, 264 A.2d 98, 107 (L. Div.
1970), af!'d per curiam, 118 NJ. Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585 (App. Div. 1972). See also
Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 881, 883-90 (1973) (discussion of the fraud exception).
42. Bouton v. Litton Indus., Inc., 423 F.2d 643, 652 (3d Cir. 1970).
43. See PINmR, supra note 24 at 623.
44. See notes 29-34 & accompanying text supra.
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The fraudulent transfer exception is also of little value to the
person injured by the acquired corporation's product after an asset
acquisition. As mentioned previously, known contract or tort claimants
can sue the directors and shareholders of the disappearing corporation
when sufficient cash reserves have not been set aside to satisfy their
claims.4 5 They can also hold the purchasing corporation liable as the
recipient of a fraudulent conveyance if the empty pockets of the disap-
pearing corporation are due to inadequate consideration for the sale.46
The cases, however, have routinely denied relief against the purchaser
when claims have arisen after the sale of assets and either the seller was
left with sufficient consideration to pay the claims of predissolution
claimants47 or there was no proof of actual fraud as to existing or
subsequent claimants.48 In the context of products liability, it is the
rare case that involves intent to defraud unforeseen tort claimants only.
More often, presently known creditors are the target of fraudulent
conveyances, either actually or, in the case of inadequate consideration,
constructively. A curious doctrine in the Uniform Fraudulent Convey-
ance Act does permit unknown or future creditors to recover without a
showing of fraudulent intent as to them personally if an intent to
defraud some other known creditor is shown or if the sale of assets was
for inadequate consideration. 9 No case, however, has imposed succes-
sor products liability on the basis of this theory of fraud. Actual or
constructive fraud, developed to protect commercial creditors,50 is not
45. Id.
46. See West Texas Ref. & Dev. Co. v. Commissioner, 68 F.2d 77, 81 (10th Cir.
1933); Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817, 820-21 (D. Colo. 1968); McKee
v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 571, 264 A.2d 98, 107 (L. Div. 1970), aff'd
per curiam, 118 N.J. Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585 (App. Div. 1972). See also Annot., 49
A.L.R.3d 881, 883, 890-97 (1973).
47. See generally Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 881, 898-99 (1973).
48. See Plann v. Morris, 239 Ala. 176, 179, 194 So. 518, 519 (1940); Severance v.
Knight-Counihan Co., 29 Cal. 2d 561, 567-68, 177 P.2d 4, 8 (1947); Heffernan v.
Bennett & Armour, 110 Cal. App. 2d 564, 243 P.2d 846, 859 (1952); V. COUNTRYMAN,
CASES ON DEBTOR AND CREDITOR 153 (1964); 1 G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES
AND PREFERENCES § 324 (rev. ed. 1940); 37 C.J.S. Fraudulent Conveyances § 168
(1943).
49. Under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act fraud can be either actual or
constructive, but in either case it is defined in relation to existing creditors. Thus, a
conveyance directly fraudulent as to an existing creditor may be indirectly fraudulent as
to a future creditor. The act provides: "Every conveyance made and every obligation
incurred without fair consideration when the person making the conveyance or entering
into the obligation intends or believes that he will incur debts beyond his ability to pay
as they mature, is fraudulent as to both present and future creditors." UNIFORM
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 6. Moreover, the act states: "Every conveyance made
and every obligation incurred with actual intent, as distinguished from intent presumed in
law, to hinder, delay, or defraud either present or future creditors, is fraudulent as to
both present and future creditors." Id. § 7.
50. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 640-44 (1972).
[Vol. 27
July 1976] SUCCESSOR CORPORATIONS' PRODUCTS LIABILITY 1313
likely to prove a source of protection for the unforeseen products
liability plaintiff whose injury may have occurred years after the manu-
facturer sold its assets. Therefore, the remaining exceptions to the rule
of nonliability in asset sales should be discussed to determine whether
such exceptions will provide sufficient protection for injured consumers.
Continuations and De Facto Mergers
Suppose A Corporation supplies a corner grocery with a shipment
of bottled "Soda Pop." A week later A sells its assets, its plant, and the
Soda Pop trademark to B Corporation for cash. B continues bottling
Soda Pop and A invests the cash in corn futures. B sends another
shipment of Soda Pop to the grocery. Both shipments are equally
defective and, as a result, highly explosive. Arnold and Beatrice shop
at the corner grocery one fine day. Arnold takes from the shelf a bottle
which happens to be from the A shipment. When it explodes and
injures Arnold, he cannot hold B liable. Beatrice, however, selects a
bottle which was right next to Arnold's bottle but came from the B
shipment. When it explodes and injures Beatrice, she can hold B liable.
If, on the other hand, the sale of A's assets had been for shares of B
stock which were distributed to A's shareholders and A immediately
dissolved instead of playing the corn futures, B could be held liable for
the injuries of both Arnold and Beatrice. This is the law,51 absurd as it
may seem to those uninitiated in the arcana of corporate law. The
predication of liability upon whether a sale of assets is for cash or for
stock and upon which of a seemingly identical group of products the
consumers purchased deserves explanation, a task less difficult than its
rationalization.
The de facto merger and continuation exceptions to the rule of
nonassumption of liability in asset sales produce the result in the forego-
ing hypothetical. According to the cases, if a purchase of assets
amounts to a merger or consolidation, or if it accomplishes a mere
continuation of the seller, the purchaser will have assumed, by operation
of law, the assets and liabilities of the seller.52 Although merger and
the continuation doctrine describe theoretically discrete transactions, the
factors relied upon by courts to establish their existence have been quite
51. See note 71 & accompanying text infra.
52. E.g., Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 800-01 (W.D. Mich.
1974). See also Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 364 (3d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975); Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452
F.2d 621, 625 (7th Cir. 1971); Schwartz v. McGraw-Edison Co., 14 Cal. App. 3d 767,
781, 92 Cal. Rptr. 776, 784 (1971).
Arguably, to call such an absorption of liabilities along with assets an assumption is
a conceptual distortion. An assumption implies acquiring the obligations of another,
ordinarily by contract. In a merger, however, two entities become one. The obligations
of each entity become those of the whole. -See PAiNTnE, supra note 24, at 618.
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similar. Before identifying these factors, some attempt should be made
to define the terms "merger or consolidation" and "continuation."
The theoretical distinction between a merger and a consolidation is
that in a merger, one corporation, which survives, absorbs the business
of another, which ceases to exist, whereas in a consolidation, the two or
more constituent corporations dissolve and a new corporation survives. 53
Other than this distinction, there is no difference. 54  Further references
will therefore be only to mergers.
All state statutes authorize mergers upon the approval of the
managements and the shareholders of the participating corporations. 55
Under the statutes, once the transaction has been approved, the business
assets and liabilities of the acquired corporation are transferred to the
acquiring corporation, the stock of the acquiring corporation is issued to
the shareholders of the merged corporation, whose stock in the old
corporation is cancelled, and articles of merger are filed with the state. 6
To put the matter more simply, a statutory merger is a filing of required
papers and a sale of all assets for stock.
To be compared with statutory mergers are de facto mergers. The
de facto merger exception to the rule of nonassumption of liability in
asset sales produces the same automatic assumption of liabilities as a
statutory merger even though the transaction purports only to be a sale
and the formal requirements of the statute, such as the filing of papers
and the approval of the prescribed fraction of shareholders, have not
been met.5 7 This result occurs only if the transaction amounts to a
53. HENN, supra note 27, at 713.
54. Since in both transactions a combined business survives the dissolution of all
other constituent corporations, the merger concept can probably embrace consolidation.
Fox, supra note 19, § 24.01l1]. The currently effective California Corporations Code
provides for both merger and consolidation. CAL. CORP. CODE § 4100 (West 1955). In
apparent recognition that the two concepts are coextensive, California's Corporations
Code revision, however, drops the distinction between merger and consolidation, provid-
ig simply that "[a]ny two or more corporations may be merged into one of such
corporations ...... Id. § 1100 (West Supp. 1976).
55. HENN, supra note 27, at 714; Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acquisition by
Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 317, 318 (1967). Most statutes also give dissenting
shareholders the right to recover the appraised value of their shares. HENN, supra note
27, at 714.
56. H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 664-65 (rev. ed. 1946); Fox, supra note 19, §§
24.01[l], 24.02; PAINTER, supra note 24, at 623. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 1107(a)
(West Supp. 1976).
Liabilities absorbed by merger include responsibility for the torts of the disappearing
corporation. FLETCHER, supra note 19, § 7121, at 185; Fox, supra note 19, §
23.02[3][a]. Such torts include injuries resulting from defective products. Cf. Moe v.
Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 21 Cal. App. 3d 289, 304, 98 Cal. Rptr. 547, 556-57
(1971).
57. See Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 800-01 (W.D. Mich.
1974); Bazan v. Kux Mach. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1250, 1251-52 (E.D. Wis. 1973);
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merger.5" The meaning of this characterization will be discussed pres-
ently.
A continuation differs from a merger, but the courts and commen-
tators have not been uniform in their descriptions of the exact nature of
the distinction. Opinions in some cases have required that for there to
be a continuation, consideration left in the seller's bank account must be
inadequate to satisfy its debts. 59 Other authorities have defined contin-
uation as a change in the form of a business through the creation of a
new corporation to receive -the assets, stockholders, and management of
the old company. 60 More recent decisions have analyzed continuation
in terms of continuity of management, business operations, and stock-
holders, whether in a new corporation or in another existing one.61
Schwartz v. McGraw-Edison Co., 14 Cal. App. 3d 767, 780-81, 92 Cal. Rptr. 776, 783-84
(1971); PAIR, supra note 24, at 623-24.
The de facto merger doctrine not only protects creditors of the selling corporation
as an exception to the general rule of nonassumption, but also protects dissenting
shareholders of the purchasing corporation, in some jurisdictions, by giving them the
right to recover the appraised value of their shares. The leading case is Farris v. Glen
Alden Corp., in which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that Glen Alden's
purchase for stock of the assets of List, although structured as a sale, amounted to a
merger. Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958). The court was
influenced by the following factors: (1) the purchaser increased in size; (2) the
purchaser expressly assumed the seller's liabilities; (3) the purchaser changed the nature
of its business; (4) the board of directors of the seller took control; (5) the value of the
purchaser's shares declined; and (6) the purchaser's shares were distributed to the
shareholders of the seller. Id. at 438, 143 A.2d at 31. Delaware has expressly rejected
the de facto merger doctrine as it has been used to protect shareholders of the purchaser.
Hariton v. Arco Electronics, 40 Del. Ch. 326, 182 A.2d 22 (Ch. 1962), a! 'd, 41 Del.
Ch. 74, 188 A.2d 123 (Sup. Ct. 1963). For a thorough discussion of the shareholder
protection aspect of the de facto merger concept, see Folk, De Facto Mergers in
Delaware: Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc., 49 VA. L. Rnv. 1261 (1963). A simplified
equivalent of a de facto merger approach for shareholders has been adopted in the
revision of the California Corporations Code, whereby shareholders of the purchasing
corporation in a stock-for-assets transaction may require the purchaser to pay them the
fair market value of their shares. CAL. CoRP. CoDE §§ 1200(c), 1201(a), 1300 (West
Supp. 1976).
58. See cases cited notes 35, 39 supra.
59. See, e.g., Atkinson v. Western Dev. Syndicate, 170 Cal. 503, 510, 150 P. 360,
363 (1915). To require inadequate consideration in order for there to be a continuation
destroys the distinction between the fraudulent conveyance and the continuation excep-
tions, making the latter superfluous.
60. See, e.g., Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621, 626 (7th
Cir. 1971); Wolff v. Shreveport Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co., 138 La. 743, 762, 70 So.
789, 795 (1916); Andres v. Morgan, 62 Ohio St. 236, 245, 56 N.E. 875, 877 (1900);
FLETCHER, supra note 19, § 7122, at 195-96; id. § 7205, at 393. A reorganization of a
financially distressed corporation under chapter ten of the Federal Bankruptcy Act is an
example of a continuation. See. Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817, 821 (D.
Colo. 1968); 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1970); FErrcHER, supra note 19, § 7201, at 386-87.
61. See, e.g., Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968);
It is certain, however, that in arguing for findings of either de facto
merger or continuation, products liability plaintiffs have generally been
unsuccessful when the asset seller remained in existence-even a paper
existence-for any purpose, or when the consideration for the sale of
assets was cash. Two often-cited cases arising from similar facts illus-
trate the substantial influence of this notion of separateness of corporate
entities upon judicial decisions to deny successor liability for lack of a de
facto merger or continuation.
In Kloberdanz v. Joy Manufacturing Co.,62 the plaintiff was in-jured by a defective part of an oil drilling rig on which he was working
in 1964. The part had been manufactured by Web-Wilson in 1953. In
1960, Joy purchased all of Web-Wilson's assets in exchange for cash,
assuming some of the latter's liabilities but not its product liabilities.
Thereafter, Joy used the name "Web-Wilson" as a trademark for a
number of its tools. Before dissolving ten months after the sale, Web-
Wilson functioned as a corporation by leasing some buildings and by
investing the $1 million consideration it had received for its assets. In
denying the existence of a de facto merger the court emphasized that the
transaction had been for cash rather than stock and that the seller had
remained in existence for ten months after the sale. 63  Hence, "[tihe
two corporate entities were completely separate and distinct before and
after the sale."64  Furthermore, there was no continuation because,
again, "Web-Wilson, Inc. continued to exist after the sale, and there was
no common identity of stock, directors, officers or stockholders between
Joy and Web-Wilson." 65
The plaintiff in McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co.66 was hurt in 1968
by a paper cutter which had been manufactured in 1916 by a company
that had sold its assets, including the right to use its name, in 1926 to
the defendant in exchange for $2 million in cash and some stock. The
manufacturing operation was continued by the purchasing corporation.
Although dissolution was required by the contract, the selling corpora-
tion was not dissolved until a little over a year after the asset acquisition.
A New Jersey superior court held there was no de facto merger because
the consideration had been primarily cash and the seller had not dis-
solved soon enough after the sale of assets.67 The court explained:
McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (L. Div. 1970), a! 'd
per curiam, 118 N.J. Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585 (App. Div. 1972). For a discussion of
these cases see notes 62-71 & accompanying text infra.
62. 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968) (applying California law).
63. Id. at 821-22.
64. Id. at 821.
65. Id.
66. 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (L. Div. 1970), af'd per curiam, 118 N.J.
Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585 (App. Div. 1972).
67. Id. at 563-67, 264 A.2d at 103-04. The court also mentioned, "[T]here is
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The corporation could no longer function as a manufacturer, yet
it could and did operate and function as a corporation for some
time after the sale. The vendor corporation, as a corporate
entity, was not absorbed into the purchasing corporation. What
was absorbed was the nature of the manufacturing operations
previously engaged in by Seybold, not the Seybold corporate
entity itself. The stockholders of Seybold continued to remain
stockholders of the Washington Machine Company [the name
adopted by Seybold pursuant -to the contract].68
That the product had not caused injury until fifty-two years after its
manufacture was of no apparent significance to the court. In denying
the existence of a continuation, the court relied upon the cash considera-
tion, the continued existence of the seller, and the lack of continuity of
management.0 9 The fact that the manufacturing operations of the seller
were continued by the purchaser was given little weight:
When one company purchases all the assets of another, it is to be
expected that the purchasing corporation will continue the opera-
tion of the former, but this does not by itself render the purchaser
liable for the obligations of the former. For liability to attach,
the purchasing corporation must represent merely a "new hat" for
the seller. 70
If, in order for there to be a continuation, there need only be a sale
of assets for stock which is distributed to the shareholders of the seller
and a prompt dissolution by the seller, then continuation is nothing
more than a confusingly different term for de facto merger. If, how-
ever, a continuation also requires continuity of management or the
creation of a new corporation for the purpose of receiving the assets of
its predecessor, continuation can be differentiated from de facto merger.
In any case, conceptual clarity does not demand that this distinction be
made. When a new corporation is created for the purpose of purchas-
ing the assets of its predecessor in exchange for stock, the transaction
can logically be labelled a de facto merger. Whether the merger is into
an old or into a new corporation is irrelevant to the analysis. Further-
more, continuity of management has little relation to the concept of
separateness of corporate entities which is the focal point of inquiries
concerning successor liability under corporate law.
here no broad assumption of liabilities such as is usually present in de facto merger
situations . . . ." Id. at 567, 264 A.2d at 104. In context, this comment refers to the
observation, by courts finding de facto mergers as a basis for granting the appraisal
remedy to shareholders of the purchaser, that these shareholders' interests were jeopar-
dized by an assumption of liabilities which the shareholders had not contemplated when
they bought their shares. See, e.g., Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 438, 143
A.2d 25, 41 (1958). If, however, a broad assumption of liabilities were a requirement,
the de facto merger exception to the nonassumption rule would become an unnecessary
restatement of the express or implied assumption exception.
68. 109 N.J. Super. at 566, 264 A.2d at 104.
69. Id. at 570, 264 A.2d at 106.
70. Id.
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Setting aside the problem of distinguishing between the exceptions,
two elements can be extracted which courts have held to be minimum
requirements for either a de facto merger or a continuation: (1) that the
seller quickly dissolve and (2) that the consideration for the sale of
assets be shares of the purchaser which are distributed to the seller's
shareholders. 71
Rigid adherence to the requirement that the seller quickly dissolve
does not comport with the principle of equity which is fundamental to
the de facto merger doctrine and other areas of commercial law-"that
courts will look to the substance and not merely to the form of a
transaction to determine its real character.17 2 Some of the cases dealing
with the question of successor products liability in asset acquisitions
have involved contracts that required the seller to dissolve in a matter of
months, yet the courts have found this period long enough to establish
corporate separateness and thereby defeat claims of de facto merger. 71
To hinge liability on whether the parties were sufficiently clever to
postpone the seller's dissolution for a strategic period elevates form over
substance. If the de facto merger doctrine is to be retained, an asset
acquisition for stock should not be less of a merger simply because its
consummation is delayed. The requirement for successor liability that
the seller promptly disappear should be modified to embrace assets-for-
stock transactions when dissolution is contractually anticipated by the
parties.7 4
71. See, e.g., Bazan v. Kux Mach. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1250, 1252 (E.D. Wis. 1973);
Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co. 288 F. Supp. 817, 821-22 (D. Colo. 1968); McKee v.
Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 565-67, 264 A.2d 98, 103-05 (L. Div. 1970),
aff'd per curiam, 118 N.J. Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585 (App. Div. 1972).
72. Burnett v. Snyder, 81 N.Y. 550, 556 (1880); see Farris v. Glen Alden Corp.,
393 Pa. 427, 432, 143 A.2d 25, 28 (1958).
73. Bazan v. Kux Mach. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1250, 1252 (E.D. Wis. 1973); McKee
v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 559, 264 A.2d 98, 100 (L. Div. 1970), aff'd
per curiam, 118 N.J. Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585 (App. Div. 1972).
74. In Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp., the court relied upon the public
policy underlying products liability law and upon the insubstantiality of the manufactur-
er's continued existence to impose liability upon a purchaser of assets for stock for the
negligence of the seller, which had remained in existence for eighteen months but had
been required by the contract to dissolve. Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506
F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975). See notes 79-85 and
accompanying text infra.
Perhaps the focus should be not upon contractually required dissolution, but rather
upon whether the circumstances surrounding the transaction indicate that dissolution was
contemplated by the parties. In one case, the seller spent ten months investing the
benefit of its bargain and then dissolved, although the sale of assets contract did not
require dissolution. Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968). In
such situations, so long as the sale of assets was for stock, a court could reasonably find
a de facto merger, delayed only by the make-work activities of the seller.
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The requirement of stock rather than cash consideration is more
troublesome. A sale of assets for stock transfers an ownership interest
in the purchaser to the selling corporation. When the seller dissolves
and distributes the purchaser's stock to the seller's shareholders, those
shareholders are left as owners of the purchaser. For all practical
purposes, a merger has occurred because the property of the dissolved
corporation is held by another corporate entity which is, in part, owned
by those who were once shareholders of the seller.75 When, on the
other hand, the sale is for the purchaser's cash, only property is trans-
ferred to the purchaser, and the selling corporation's shareholders are
left with no interest in the buyer.7 6 In this situation, neither a merger
nor a continuation has occurred. 77 Thus, the courts view the distribu-
tion of stock consideration to the shareholders of the seller as a major
requirement for finding a de facto merger.78
From the consumer's point of view it is hardly sufficient to use
corporate legal theory to explain the judicial practice of predicating the
consumer's right to recovery on whether the errant manufacturer sold its
assets for cash or for stock, especially when the purchaser continues the
product line. If products liability indeed reflects important social poli-
cies, it is not justifiable to base its defeat on the fact that in a transfer of
assets from one corporation to another, the consideration was cash and
not shares of stock. The socially sensitive policies behind products
liability law have been ignored in making this distinction. Two cases,
however, provide notable exceptions to the failure of the judiciary to
analyze successor liability in light of public policy.
Judicial Recognition of Public Policy
Rationales for Imposing Successor Products Liability
Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp.79 was a diversity case in
which the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit applied Pennsylvania
law to impose successor products liability upon a purchaser of assets for
stock even though the acquired corporation continued functioning sepa-
rately after the sale, thereby placing the existence of a de facto merger in
doubt. Rockwell was held liable for the injury of a worker caused by a
defective packaging machine manufactured by Textile Machine Works
(TMW) despite the fact that after the purchase of TMW's assets for
75. See text accompanying note 56 supra. See also W. CARY, CASES ON CoR-
PORATiONS 1703 (4th ed. 1969).
76. See Pinellas Ice Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462, 470 (1933); Cortland
Speciality Co. v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 937, 939 (2d Cir. 1932).
77. See cases cited note 76 supra.
78. See Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 801 (W.D. Mich.
1974); Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 437, 143 A.2d 25, 31 (1958).
79. 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975), noted in 6
SErON HALL L. Rlv. 477 (1975).
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Rockwell stock, TMW remained in existence for eighteen months. 0
Although the merger requirement that the seller dissolve immediately
after the sale had not been met, the court treated the transaction as a
merger. 81
It was suggested earlier that a de facto merger should be found, as
a matter of corporate law, when the sale contract requires eventual
dissolution of the transferor.82 The court in Knapp, however, did not
rely solely upon the logic of elevating substance over form. According
to the court, the case called for "an analysis of public policy considera-
tions rather than... a mere procrustean application of formalities. ' ' 83 In
view of the public policy of shifting the losses caused by defective
products away from the victim, the empty existence of TMW after the
sale was not allowed to defeat recovery, especially since TMW's dissolu-
tion was required by the asset sale contract "as soon as practicable."'8 4
As between plaintiff Knapp and Rockwell, the latter was deemed better
able to spread the loss because it could easily have obtained an assign-
ment of TMW's prepaid products liability insurance policy.8 5
Since the sale of assets was for stock, the opinion in Knapp did not
address the question whether the public policy of spreading losses could
justify holding a purchaser of assets for cash liable for the acquired
corporation's product defects. The court in Knapp did, however, evince
a refreshing willingness to disregard the formalisms of corporate law
when dealing with a products liability claim.
The only case to date holding a purchaser of assets for cash liable
for the transferor's defective products is Cyr v. B. Offen & Co.8" After
the death in 1962 of the sole proprietor of the B. Offen Company,
which manufactured printing presses and dryers, key employees formed
a new corporation named B. Offen & Co. to purchase the predecessor's
assets from the proprietor's executor, agreeing to assume the obligation
to service old ovens. The purchase agreement specifically excluded
assumption of liability for the predecessor's torts. The new corporation
continued to manufacture the same kind of product in the manner of the
old company. In 1969, two employees of a printing company were
severely burned, one fatally, while cleaning the inside of an Offen print
dryer that had been sold to their employer in 1959. The dryer was
defective because it lacked a fail safe device which could have prevented
80. 506 F.2d at 363, 368-70.
81. Id. at 368-70.
82. See notes 72-74 & accompanying text supra.
83. Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 369 (3d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975).
84. Id. at 369.
85. Id. at 370.
86. 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974), noted in 16 B. C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 676
(1975).
1320 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 27
July 1976] SUCCESSOR CORPORATIONS' PRODUCTS LIABEUTY 1
ignition while workers were inside.8 7  The Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit held the successor, B. Offen & Co., liable even though it
had no identity of ownership with its predessor.88 The court, therefore,
departed from the established analysis of the continuation exception to
the rule of nonassumption in ruling that, in light of public policy
considerations, continuity of manufacture and service of a product line
by the same employees in the same plant is sufficient for a continua-
tion.8 9 In imposing liability, the court relied upon the public policies
underlying the products liability of an original manufacturer stating:
The very existence of strict liability for manufacturers implies a
basic judgment that the hazards of predicting and insuring for risk
from defective products are better borne by the manufacturer
than the consumer. The manufacturer's successor, carrying over
the experience and expertise of the manufacturer, is likewise in a
better position than the consumer to gauge the risks and the costs
of meeting them. The successor knows the product, is as able to
calculate the risk of defects as the predecessor, is in [a] position
to insure therefor and reflect such cost in sale negotiations, and
is the only entity capable of improving the quality of the product.
[I]t is true that the successor . . . was not the legal entity
which launched the product on the stream of commerce or made
an implied representation as to its safety. But in the most real
sense it is profiting from [and] exploiting all of the accumulated
good will which the products have earned, both in its outward
representations of continuity and in its internal adherence to the
same line of equipment.90
In its attempt to fit the case within the continuation exception, the
court in Cyr was eager to find as many earmarks of continuity as
possible. Continuity of product line, employees, and location were
stressed. Nevertheless, the public policies relied upon by the court to
place responsibility upon the successor for products marketed before the
change in entities are supportive of the predication of successor lia-
bility upon continuation of the product line. The public policies
advanced by the court require no inquiry into whether the product is
manufactured by the same employees at the same facility.9 '
87. 501 F.2d at 1149.
88. Id. at 1151-54.
89. Id. at 1152-54.
90. Id. at 1154.
91. The court in Cyr said, "[A] corporation itself cannot act. It can conduct its
business only through its officers and employees. The negligence of employees in
carrying out that business is the responsibility of the corporate body. If as a group the
same employees continue, without pause to produce the same products in the same plant,
with the same supervision, the ownership of the entity which maintains essentially the
same name cannot be the sole controlling determinant of liability." Id. at 1154. By
making continuity of employees a determinant of successor liability, the court seems to
have blurred the distinction between the law of negligence, which requires fault of the
defendant or its agents, and the law of strict products liability, which shifts the cost of
321
Four public policies justifying the strict liability of manufacturers
were invoked by the court to impose liability upon the successor corpo-
ration. As applied to the successor these policies are: (1) that the
successor is better able than the consumer to insure against, and to
reflect in the price of the assets, the risk of product-related harm; (2)
that the successor should take the burden of liability for previously sold
products along with the benefit of an established product line; (3) that
by its "outward representations of continuity" the successor adopts and
should be bound by its predecessor's implied representations of product
safety; and (4) that the business capable of improving the quality of the
product should bear responsibility for injuries caused by the product.92
The fourth policy mentioned by the court is an unpersuasive rationale
for imposing successor liability, because improvement of a product line
has no relevance to injuries caused by products marketed before the
correction. Although liability for its predecessor's defectively designed
products may induce the successor to change its design to prevent future
injuries, the inducement would be equally strong if the successor were
simply alerted to such mishaps. Thus, the successor's ability to improve
its product does not, standing alone, demand that liability attach to the
successor for preexisting defective products. Nonetheless, in Cyr the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit pointed the way toward making
continuation of the product line rather than congruence of corporate
entities the determinant of successor products liability. The first three
public policy rationales mentioned by the court should be examined in
some detail.
The Policies Underlying Products Liability Law
The legal protection afforded the users of products has steadily
expanded since the days when liability required breach of an express
warranty or negligence based upon privity of contract between the seller
and the plaintiff. 3 The apex of this development, whether couched in
warranty language or described as strict liability in tort, is the liability
without fault of sellers of chattels to third persons with whom they are
not in privity of contract. 4
injuries from vulnerable consumers to product sellers who are deemed better able to bear
the loss. For a discussion of the policy reasons justifying strict products liability see
notes 98-102 & accompanying text infra.
92. 501 F.2d at 1154.
93. See generally Pasley, The Protection of the Purchaser and Consumer Under
the Law of the U.S.A., 32 MODERN L. REV. 241 (1969); Prosser, The Assault Upon the
Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to
the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966); Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of
Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363 (1965).
94. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
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According to the Restatement Second of Torts, the seller of an
"unreasonably dangerous"9' 5 product is liable for the harm it causes to
the user if the seller is in the business of selling such products and the
product was expected to and did reach the user without substantial
change, even though the seller has exercised all possible care. 6 Strict
products liability in tort has been adopted in most jurisdictions.97
Fault has been replaced by strict liability because of three public
policy justifications for imposing tort liability on the product seller.
These policies are: (1) that the public interest in human life and safety
requires that the manufacturer, who by placing a product on the market
represents that it is safe, take full responsibility for any harm resulting
from an unsafe product; (2) that as between the seller of the product
and the injured consumer, the public interest demands that the burden
of the loss be borne by the party responsible for putting the product on
the market, as that party is likely to be in a better position to obtain
insurance or otherwise spread the risk; and (3) that one who obtains the
commercial advantage of a product should bear the losses arising from
the use of that product as a cost of doing business.
The first policy recognizes that manufacturers and other sellers
have so effectively marketed their products that consumers do not guard
against defects.98 As Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court
stated in his prescient concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bot-
tling Co.:99
Manufacturing processes, frequently valuable secrets, are ordinar-
ily either inaccessible to or beyond the ken of the general public.
The consumer no longer has means or skill enough to investigate
for himself the soundness of a product, even when it is not
contained in a sealed package, and his erstwhile vigilance has
been lulled by the steady efforts of manufacturers to build up
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A (1965).
95. A comment after section 402A of the Second Restatement defines the phrase
"unreasonably dangerous" as "dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A,
comment i (1965). California and a few other states have rejected this requirement as a
"regression" to a negligence theory of liability. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal.
3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972); Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 123 NJ.
Super. 599, 304 A.2d 562 (L. Div. 1973).
96. RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
97. PRossnx, supra note 15, at 657-58 (stating that as of 1971, two-thirds of the
states had accepted the theory).
98. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63-64, 377 P.2d 897,
901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453,
467, 150 P.2d 436, 443 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); PRossER, supra note 15, at
651.
99. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
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confidence by advertising and marketing devices such as trade-
marks. Consumers no longer approach products warily but
accept them on faith, relying on the reputation of the manufactur-
er or the trademark.' 00
Trademarks and advertising can be taken as representations that the
products concerned will be safe. Product safety is a public expectation,
as demonstrated by the willingness of consumers to use products in their
daily routines. When a product causes injury, this public expectation
becomes disappointment. The injured consumer looks to the manufac-
turer for redress.
The second policy shifts the burden of a personal injury away from
the product's victim to the manufacturer or other seller who is in a better
position to obtain insurance which spreads the risk.' The manufac-
turer can decide whether to produce a safer product or to pass the cost
of insurance for the dangerous product on to consumers in the price of
the product. In theory, dangerous products will eventually be forced
off the market owing to their high prices. If a manufacturer is not in a
position to manipulate prices to recoup the cost of insurance, it will be
impelled more directly to make a safer product or go out of business.
Our legal system thus seems to place greater importance upon the
protection of life and limb than upon the assurance of business success.
The third public policy upon which courts have relied to impose
liability without negligence upon the sellers of chattels is that it is fairer
to require the commercial beneficiaries of the market to bear the loss
than to impose this burden on the injured plaintiff. 2
These policy reasons for strict liability can be summarized. The
manufacturer occupies a relationship with the marketplace whereby it
represents, albeit impliedly, that its product is safe and benefits from the
willingness of consumers to use the product without question. When
the product injures someone, it is appropriate to hold the seller liable.
Such liability promotes the goal of spreading the risk of product-related
injuries through insurance which is available to the seller.
A New Rule for Successor Liability
The matrix of corporate and creditor protection rules, previously
100. Id. at 467, 150 P.2d at 443 (citations omitted).
101. See Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 802 (W.D. Mich.
1974); Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 18-19, 403 P.2d 145, 151, 45 Cal. Rptr.
17, 23 (1965); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441
(1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358,
379, 161 A.2d 69, 81 (1960).
102. Section 402A of the Second Restatement reflects this policy by requiring that
the seller of a defective product be in the business of selling the product in order to be
held liable. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). See Suvada v. White
Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 618-19, 210 N.E.2d 182, 186 (1965).
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discussed, 10 3 which define the limits of the responsibility of corporate
successors for the torts of their predecessors allow courts to ignore the
social policies underlying products liability. It is for this reason and the
reasons to be discussed subsequently that the following rule is proposed
for judicial consideration:
A business that acquires and substantially continues to manu-
facture the product line of a predecessor manufacturing corpora-
tion shall be liable for injuries caused during its continuation of
the product line by units of the product placed upon the market
before the acquisition to the same extent that the original manu-
facturer of the product would have been liable but for the ac-
quisition.
Justification
The proposed rule is based on the relation of the successor to the
market that was once occupied by the manufacturer of the defective
product and is consistent with the history of strict products liability in
warranty. Warranty is no longer the sole ground for strict liability
recovery in most states because of the difficulties plaintiffs encountered
in overcoming disclaimers and notice of breach,10 and because the tort
theory of strict liability was deemed a more forthright approach to the
products liability problem. Nevertheless, the warranty concept of repre-
sentation to the public and the resultant expectation of safety remains a
cogent public policy underlying strict products liability.'0 5 One ration-
ale for the proposed rule is that when a successor steps into the shoes of
a manufacturer, there is an implied assumption of that manufacturer's
implied representations to the public. Perhaps, however, it is better to
avoid couching the rationale for the proposed rule in warranty language
and to explain the rule as a logical extension of the policies which have
been used to impose strict liability upon the manufacturers and interme-
diate sellers of products.' 0 6 Those policies apply with equal force to
successors.
103. See notes 35-78 & accompanying text supra.
104. PROSSEP, supra note 15, at 655-58; see Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc.,
59 Cal. 2d 57, 60-62, 377 P.2d 897, 899-900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 699-700(1963).
105. In Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., Justice Traynor referred to the
consumer's reliance on an implied representation, noting: "Implicit in the machine's
presence on the market, however, was a representation that it would safely do the jobs
for which it was built. Under these circumstances, it should not be controlling whether
plaintiff selected the machine because of the statements in the brochure, or because of
the machine's own appearance of excellence that belied the defect lurking beneath the
surface, or because he merely assumed that it would safely do the jobs it was built to do."
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 64, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 701 (1963). See also Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in California,
18 HASTINGS L.J 9, 19 (1966).
106. See text accompanying notes 98-102 supra.
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A purchaser of the assets, plant, and trade names of a manufactur-
er enters into the same relationship with the market that was maintained
by its predecessor. By continuing the business of manufacturing the
product, the successor makes itself the object of the uninterrupted
expectations of the public. As Justice Fleming pointed out in his dis-
sent in Ortiz v. South Bend Lathe:10 7
Amsted, having undertaken to operate the business, thereby
assumed the risks growing out of the continuity of business
operation. One of these risks was product liability for defective
machinery put in circulation at an earlier time and never correct-
ed. While users of an orphaned product no longer actively
manufactured or marketed cannot look to an existing manufactur-
er for parts, repairs, service, information, and the like, users of a
product that continues to be manufactured, marketed, and serv-
iced under its original trade name can reasonably expect a degree
of protection from the entity currently carrying on the business,
even though that entity may not be the one that originally
manufactured and marketed the particular item involved. °08
The policy of protecting consumers because of the public expectation of
safety is frustrated when the law, as interpreted by the majority in Ortiz,
allows no remedy against a successor who is the current beneficiary of
the manufacturer-consumer relationship.
The policy of distributing the risks of defective products also
applies to a company that succeeds to the business of manufacturing a
product. The successor is better able than the consumer to obtain
insurance to spread the risk. Like original manufacturers, successors
should be made to provide for the dangers of their businesses. The
proposed rule would induce the parties to a sale of a product line to
consider and insure against, rather than to ignore as under the present
system, the possibility of liability for defective products which have been
placed on the market by the manufacturer. Adjustments could accord-
ingly be made in the sale price of the assets.
Furthermore, the rule would establish the same protection for
products liability plaintiffs as that currently enjoyed by contract credi-
tors. Owing to the present limitations on liability, there is little incen-
tive for the purchaser to agree during sale negotiations to assume
unforeseen products liability because the seller cannot effectively be
sued on a claim arising an appreciable time after its dissolution.0 9 In
contrast, part of the consideration in many asset sales is the assumption
by the purchaser of the known liabilities of the seller."0  Products
107. 46 Cal. App. 3d 842, 850, 120 Cal. Rptr. 556, 560 (1975) (Fleming, J.,
dissenting); see text accompanying notes 6-13 supra.
108. 46 Cal. App. 3d at 850, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 561.
109. See notes 29-34 & accompanying text supra.
110. See Painter, supra note 24, at 623.
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liability plaintiffs deserve as much protection as contract creditors, and
this protection could be afforded by making the parties to an asset sale
allocate the cost of products liability insurance premiums between them-
selves.
The third public policy mentioned above n should also apply to
successors. Although the successor does not obtain the benefit of the
profit from the original sale of the dangerous product, it does obtain the
advantage of the reputation and trademarks of a going business. Along
with obtaining the benefit of an established product, the successor
should bear the losses arising from the use of that product.
To date, the courts have normally applied the public policies
underlying products liability only to manufacturers or other sellers who
helped place the product on the market. The requirement, in the
absence of assumption of liabilities by contract or corporate law, that the
defendant actually have been associated with the particular product that
caused the injury is simply a rational technique for circumscribing the
system of liability without fault. The boundaries of strict liability can
be altered, without sacrificing rationality, to include the automatic as-
sumption of predecessor products liability by the corporation acquiring
an ongoing business.
Another obstacle to the implementation of the proposed rule of
liability assumption is the rule that a bona fide purchaser of assets for
value does not assume liability unless a de facto merger or other
exception is found. The rule and the de facto merger and continuation
exceptions conform to corporate legal theory and produce a logical
result. A purchaser of assets for cash is deemed an entity separate from
the seller, while a purchaser for stock is treated as a surviving corpora-
tion in a merger or continuation and therefore as a part of the same
corporate entity as the disappearing corporation." 2  Accordingly, the
purchaser of assets for stock is, in part, the same corporation that was
responsible for placing the defective product on the market, whereas the
purchaser for cash is "separate and distinct before and after the sale."113
To impose liability for its predecessor's product defects upon a purchas-
er for cash would make it responsible for conduct not its own. Such a
result is not, however, foreign to the law. For example, employers who
have'not themselves engaged in tortious conduct are held vicariously
liable for the acts or omissions of employees." 4 Public policy demands
that the risk of employee torts be allocated to the enterprise which
profits from the employment relation and is in a better position than tort
111. See note 102 & accompanying text supra.
112. See notes 75-78 & accompanying text supra.
113. Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817, 821 (D. Colo. 1968).
114. See, e.g., Eule v. Eule Motor Sales, 34 N.J. 537, 544, 170 A.2d 241, 244-45 (L.
Div. 1961); PRossER, supra note 15, at 458-59.
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victims to obtain insurance to absorb losses. 115 As discussed previously,
similar policies support holding the successor in an asset sale for cash
liable for the defective products of its predecessor when it sustains the
product line.11 6 Thus, although the corporate law rules delineating
successor liability have a certain technical appeal, they should not simply
be recited to dispose of products liability cases when important social
policies are at stake. A balance must be struck between the policies
supporting products liability and those supporting the limitations on
liability defined by the bona fide purchaser rule and its exceptions in
order to determine the propriety of imposing liability upon the purchas-
er for cash for the defective products of the manufacturer whose business
is continued.
The bona fide purchaser rule and its technical exceptions offer an
attractive prospect for those desiring to expand their commercial hori-
zons. By purchasing assets for cash instead of purchasing them for
stock or instead of buying the acquired corporation's stock so as to make
it a subsidiary, 117 the acquiring company can avoid unknown liabilities
such as those stemming from products liability claims."' Arguably,
such avoidance of liability is supported by a public interest in commer-
cial development through the rehabilitation of enterprises which may be
floundering because of poor management." 9 Business planners want to
predict, with some precision, the costs of asset acquisitions and may
shudder at the thought of unknown liabilities. 20 A rule of assumption
in asset sales for cash when continuation of a product line is contemplat-
ed could conceivably make such acquisitions less attractive.
Nevertheless, the interest in human life and safety, which supports
the allocation of risk to those associated with a defective product, seems
to outweigh the interest in marketability of the manufacturer's assets.
The scales would be more evenly balanced if competing economic or
property interests were at stake. In any case, the effect of the proposed
rule on commercial development is minimized by the fact that the
successor desires insurance protection against liability for defective
goods sold after the asset acquisition.' 2' Because products liability
115. PROSSER, supra note 15, at 458-59.
116. See text accompanying notes 107-11 supra.
117. See note 23 supra.
118. See text accompanying notes 71, 75-78 supra.
119. See Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 802 (W.D. Mich.
1974).
120. See Note, Assumption of Product Liability in Corporate Acquisitions, 55
B.U.L. REV. 86, 91 (1975).
121. In Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., the court found a de facto merger and
therefore held the successor liable. Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797,
801 (W.D. Mich. 1974). The court observed, in dicta, that "[in practice in nearly all
cases, the acquiring corporation will merely arrange for the continuation of the products
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insurance indemnifies the insured against legal liability to third per-
sons,1"' implementation of the proposed rule would require little altera-
tion of existing insurance policies to cover the successor-defendant held
liable for goods sold before the acquisition. Insurance eliminates any
objection to the proposed rule on the grounds of unpredictability of the
costs of an asset acquisition because the only added cost would be
increased premiums commensurate with the augmented exposure of the
carrier. Such added costs are not a persuasive argument against the
proposed rule because such costs would simply require the successor to
accept the burdens along with the benefits of a preexisting product line.
Boundaries of the Rule
Some observations should be made about the scope of the proposed
rule. First, whereas the current law on successor products liability is
phrased in terms of assumption of liabilities by contract, by fraudulent
conveyance, or by alterations in corporate entities, 23 the proposed rule
focuses on continuation of the business of making the predecessor's
product. Continuation of management and employees, in contrast,
would not be a controlling factor in applying the rule because such
continuation has little relevance to the public expectation of product
safety. Furthermore, for its application, the suggested rule would not
require a purchase of assets. In most situations other than a statutory
merger, 124 de facto merger,12 5 or stock acquisition,' 26 continuation of a
product line has entailed a purchase of assets, plant, and trademarks or
trade names of a manufacturer. 127  Under the proposed rule, however, a
company that buys the trademark but not the plant of a manufacturer in
order to make the product at its own facilities could be held liable for
injuries resulting from units of the product sold before acquisition of the
trademark. Liability for a defective product would run with its identity
liability insurance maintained by the seller, and the price of the acquired corporation will
be adjusted to take the projected premium into account. The decision of the court
simply means that the seller and purchaser corporations will not both be able to profit by
cutting off liability for damages to battered and maimed people." Id. at 802.
122. I KEETON, INSURANCE LAw 232 (1971); PRossER, supra note 15, at 541-42.
123. See notes 35-41 & accompanying text supra.
124. See notes 55-56 & accompanying text supra.
125. See notes 57, 62-78 & accompanying text supra.
126. See note 23 supra.
127. See, e.g., Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 363 (3d Ciu.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975); Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1151
(1st Cir. 1974); Bazan v. Kux Mach. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1250, 1251 (E.D. Wis. 1973);
Ortiz v. South Bend Lathe, 46 Cal. App. 3d 842, 845-46, 120 Cal. Rptr. 556, 557-58
(1975); McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 559, 264 A.2d 98, 100 (L.
Div. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 118 NJ. Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585 (App. Div. 1972);
Jennings Neff & Co. v. Crystal Ice Co., 128 Tenn. 231, 159 S.W. 1088 (1913).
in the market. Since product identity is the focal point of the rule, it
makes little difference whether the product is made at the plant of the
original manufacturer or at that of the successor.
Second, it could be argued that successors who have discontinued
manufacturing the product at the time of the injury should not be liable
under the rule. The successor that has discontinued or sold to another
corporation an acquired product line is unlike an original manufacturer,
which can be held liable, as a corporate entity, even after dropping its
product line. The successor is a separate corporate entity. The con-
nection between the product which caused the harm and a successor that
no longer identifies itself with the product line is more tenuous than that
between a product and an original manufacturer that has discontinued
the product line. If courts willing to apply the proposed rule deemed it
proper to deny its application when the successor has discontinued the
product before the plaintiff's injury, such a plaintiff would have to rely
upon corporate assumption of liability rules in the absence of a further
successor. A requirement that the successor be engaged in manufactur-
ing the offending product line at the time of the plaintiff's injury might
therefore construct the same kind of procrustean bed that the rule is
designed to dismantle. Suppose A manufactures gismos and sells one to
plaintiff in 1965. B purchases A's assets, plant, and name for cash in
1966 and continues manufacturing gismos until 1975, at which time B
discovers a substantial design defect in the product line. B hastily
enters a different line of business. Two weeks later plaintiff is injured
by his gismo. Applying the public policies of products liability, a court
might grant recovery. Perhaps a more difficult case would be posed if
the successor continued the product for only a short time and the
plaintiff were injured ten years after discontinuation. Rather than
probe the problem of product line discontinuation with a rough sense of
justice, this writer desires merely to point out that a problem exists. It is
possible that the problem will never arise in an actual case because
manufacturers normally take their chances with potential future liability
in order to continue business in the present.
Third, liability for defective products under the rule would run to
successors of the manufacturer but not to successors of an intermediate
seller of the product. Suppose A makes widgets and sells them to
distributor B, and B's assets and name are purchased by C, C could not
be held liable for A's defective widgets that B sold before the acquisi-
tion, even though A and B have gone out of business. Again, the rule
would attach liability to the activity of making the product that caused
the harm. It is reasonable to limit liability to the business that identifies
itself to the public as the maker of a product. Retailers and other
distributors of defective products are usually mere conduits who, when
held liable for a defect in the product, have a right to indemnity against
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the manufacturer because of the latter's immediate fault.128  The liabili-
ty of the manufacturer is primary, whereas that of the distributor or
retailer is secondary. As discussed previously, public policy justifies
imputing the products liability of the dissolved manufacturer to the cur-
rent maker of its product. A much stronger set of policies would seem
necessary to impute the passive liability of an intermediate seller to its
successor. Such liability is not here proposed.
Fourth, the suggested rule supplements rather than replaces the
body of rules which currently determine the scope of successor liability.
Thus, when a sale of assets constitutes a de facto merger, the acquiring
corporation would be liable for its predecessor's tort even if its trade
name were not acquired and the product line were not continued.
Furthermore, contract creditors of the dissolved manufacturer would not
be able to sue a mere purchaser of assets or trademarks for cash. The
suggested rule is for the relief of products liability plaintiffs whose
claims arise after the acquisition. Creditors whose claims are known at
the time of a corporate acquisition are adequately protected under the
existing law, since the dissolving corporation must provide for them,
either by setting aside ample funds or by contracting with the acquiring
corporation for express assumption of debts. 29
Fifth, the product successor should have a right to indemnity
against its predecessor. The doctrine of implied indemnity "permits one
of two tortfeasors to shift the entire loss to the other when, without
active fault on the claimant's part, he has been compelled by reason of
some legal obligation to pay damages occasioned by the immediate fault
of the other.' 130  This doctrine could be applied in the odd case in
which the manufacturer sheds the product line but retains its corporate
entity for some other activity and the plaintiff sues the current maker of
the product. In such a case the successor could sue or implead its
predecessor for indemnity and the injured plaintiff would not be re-
quired to select a defendant at peril.
Sixth, states that have not accepted strict liability for product
defects, under the implied warranty theory or the tort theory,18' would
128. Ford Motor Co. v. Robert J. Poeschl, Inc., 21 Cal. App. 3d 694, 696, 98 Cal.
Rptr. 702, 703-04 (1971).
129. See notes 30-33 & accompanying text supra.
130. Ford Motor Co. v. Robert J. Poeschl, Inc., 21 Cal. App. 3d 694, 696, 98 Cal.
Rptr. 702, 703-04 (1971). Quoting the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the court stated:
'The right to indemnity rests upon a difference between the primary and secondary
liability of two persons each of whom is made responsible by the law to an injured
party .... mhe important point to be noted in all the cases is that secondary as
distinguished from primary liability rests upon a fault that is imputed or constructive
only, being based on some legal relation between the parties. . . ." Id. at 696-97, 98
Cal. Rptr. at 703-04, quoting Builders Supply Co. v. McCabe, 366 Pa. 322, 325-26, 77
A.2d 368, 370-71 (1951).
131. For a discussion of the two types of strict liability see PRossER, supra note 15,
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have difficulty applying the proposed rule because it is based on the
policies underlying strict liability.'32 For successor liability, such states
would probably require proof of independent negligence on the part of
the acquiring corporation. Negligence of the purchaser could consist of
participation in the manufacture or distribution of a product which was
negligently designed or assembled, 3 3 breach of a duty arising from a
service relationship with the predecessor's customers, 34 or failure to
warn prior customers after discovering a defect through testing. 33
On the other hand, in a jurisdiction recognizing strict liability, the
proposed rule could be applied to successors even in cases in which the
defective product was placed on the market owing to the carelessness of
the original manufacturer. In such jurisdictions, courts are not deterred
from imposing liability upon middlemen such as wholesalers and retail-
ers when the only negligent party was the manufacturer. 3 ' Such
intermediaries are as free from negligence as successors to the business
of manufacturing the product.
Conclusion
From the consumer's perspective, the consequences of a statutory
merger, de facto merger, or continuation are identical to those of a
purchase of assets or trade name when the continued manufacture of a
product is the purpose of the transaction. The product continues to be
advertised and to appear on the market, and prior purchasers of the
product continue to use it. The consequence of products liability,
however, varies with the type of corporate acquisition. Although a
person who continues to use a product after its manufacturer has sold its
business naturally expects protection from the company currently pro-
ducing the item, the law now affords such protection erratically. In
many cases in which the product user is injured after an asset acquisi-
tion, the manufacturer of the particular offending product has dissolved,
lawfully distributing the proceeds of the transaction to contract creditors
and to its shareholders. If such products liability plaintiffs are to have a
remedy, therefore, it must be against the successor to the manufacturing
at 650-82. As of 1971, two-thirds of the states had adopted strict products liability in
tort and only eight states had adopted neither the tort nor the warranty form of strict
liability. Id. at 655, 657-58.
132. See notes 104-11 & accompanying text supra.
133. See Chadwick v. Air Reduction Co., 239 F. Supp. 247, 249-50 (N.D. Ohio
1965).
134. Id.
135. See Shane v. Hobam, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 526, 528-30 (E.D. Pa. 1971). But see
Chadwick v. Air Reduction Co., 239 F. Supp. 247, 250 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
136. The seller need only place on the market a defective product which is expected
to reach its user without substantial change. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs §
402A(1) (1965).
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business. Under the corporate law, there can be no recovery against the
successor unless it expressly or impliedly agreed to assume products
liability, purchased for stock the assets of a manufacturer who promptly
dissolved, or committed actual or constructive fraud as to known credi-
tors of the predecessor. Thus, by careful planning, corporate successors
are able to avoid responsibility for products marketed before the acquisi-
tion of a product line.
Social policies, which have been articulated to explain holding the
manufacturer strictly liable for its defective products, can be invoked to
justify holding the successor to a product line liable for injuries caused
by products marketed before the acquisition. By continuing to market
a product, the successor impliedly represents that it is safe. It is logical
to conclude that the representation runs to consumers who continue to
use the product after its manufacturer has dissolved. Furthermore, the
corporation that steps into the manufacturer's shoes is better able than
the plaintiff to obtain insurance to spread the risk. Finally, it is fair to
require the successor to take the personal injury burdens of a product
line along with the commercial advantages of acquiring an established
name.
On the premise that the public policies underlying products liability
should be reflected in all cases involving product-related injuries, this
note has proposed that products liability be automatically assumed by
companies that acquire the business of manufacturing a product line.
The rule would protect the consumer fortuitously injured after the
product line has changed hands.
As this note was in its final stages of preparation for publication,
the California court of appeal took an approach very similar to the one
proposed. In Ray v. Alad Corp.,'8 7 the court held a corporation liable
for a defective ladder sold before the defendant had acquired the assets,
name, and product line of its predecessor, even though no continuity of
ownership existed between the two corporate entities. The only forms
of continuity were those of product identity and business location.
Unlike the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Cyr. v. B. Offen &
Co.,' 8 the California court made no attempt to squeeze its case into an
ill-fitting corporate law analysis. According to the court, "The manu-
facturing entity's responsibility to the victims of defective products it has
placed in circulation cannot be hostage to the niceties which distinguish
a sale of assets from a merger."'' 1 9 Instead, the court analyzed the case
137. 127 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1976), petition for hearing granted, No. L.A. 30613 (Sup.
Ct., Apr. 28, 1976). Because the petition for hearing has been granted, the vacated
opinion of the court of appeal may not, of course, be cited to the California Supreme
Court.
138. 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974). See text accompanying note 91 supra.
139. Ray v. Alad Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 855, 861, 127 Cal. Rptr. 817, 821 (1976).
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solely in terms of tort law policies and emphasized that "it is the entity
which continues to carry the business which can best distribute the
individual and social costs of injuries to the public-principally, of
course, by insurance.' 140 Perhaps the Ray case will mark the beginning
of a trend toward viewing continuation of a product line as sufficient for
the imposition of successor products liability. The court did not ex-
pressly so hold. In addition to continuity of the product line, the Ray
court stressed the successor's continued operation "at the same old
stand.' 41 It has been suggested in this note that the purchase of a
product name in order to continue manufacturing the product at a plant
other than that of the predecessor could warrant application of the
proposed rule. From the perspective of consumers who have little
awareness of changes in corporate entities, all that occurs in such a case
is a change in the location of the manufacturer, leaving the product's
identity intact. Part of the rationale for the proposed rule is that the law
should uphold the public expectation of product safety. That expecta-
tion has little to do with the location of a manufacturing operation.
Application of a rule requiring liability assumption in the acquisi-
tion of product lines would probably not be free of difficulty. The
determination of the minimum elements of continuation of a product
line would demand especially careful analysis. Like other rules, the
proposed rule has a core of certainty in application surrounded by
potentially hard cases requiring judicial discretion.
James A. Barringer*
140. Id. at 860, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
141. Id.
* Member, Second Year Class.
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